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Cost  and  value  are  central  in  economic  explanations  of  behavior.  Three  general  dimensions  in  cost 
can  be  distinguished:  outlay  versus  opportunity,  private  versus  social,  and  objective  versus 
subjective.  On  the  basis  of  these  dimensions,  a  number  of  conceptions  of  costs  are  described. 
Non-monetary  from  monetary  costs  are  distinguished.  It  is  argued  that  social  psychology,  in 
particular  attitude  theory,  has  largely  neglected  cost,  and  that  much  can  be  gained  from  including 
the  concept  into  social  psychological  theories  of  behavior.  Implications  of  distinguishing  different 
cost  conceptions  and  types  for  research  on  social  behavior  are  formulated. 
Introduction 
Psychological  economics  (Katona  1980)  or  economic  psychology 
studies  ‘ . . .  the  behavior  of  consumers/citizens  that  involves  economic 
decisions,  and  the  determinants  and  consequences  of  economic  deci- 
sions’  (Van  Raaij  1981:  2).  Economic  decisions  are  defined  broadly  to 
include  money,  time,  and  effort  to  obtain  products,  services,  work, 
leisure,  the choice  between  product  alternatives,  spending  versus  saving 
decisions.  Economic  psychology  is not  merely  another  form  of  applied 
psychology.  Since  ‘ . . .  in  fact,  all  decisions  that  involve  a  choice  or 
trade-off  of  some  alternative  or  an  investment  that  will  bring  future 
profits  or  benefits  may  be  called  an  economic  decision’  (Van  Raaij 
1981:  2.).  In  economic  psychology,  economic  behavior  is  analyzed 
using  equipment  developed  in  economics  and  psychology,  while  many 
more  decisions  than  lay  people  would  think  of  are  governed  by  eco- 
nomic  considerations  (Lea  et  al.  1987). 
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Here,  a  central  issue  in  economic  psychology  is  briefly  introduced, 
cost  and  the  nature  of  cost.  Cost  is  a  central  topic  in  economic 
reasoning.  Accounting  theory  was  developed  to  ‘account’  for  it.  In 
mainstream  psychology  only  occasional  attention  has  been  given  to  the 
costs  associated  with  behavior.  Recently,  Meyer  (1982)  argued  that 
social  psychological  theories  of  attitudes  have  generally  placed  a strong 
emphasis  on  the benefits  of behavior,  without  paying  much  attention  to 
the  costs  people  have  to  make  in  order  (to  be  able)  to  behave.  This 
statement  may  apply  to  social  psychological  theory  more  in  general. 
Insight  in  the  nature  of  costs,  in  the  categories  of  costs  and  in  the 
location  of  costs  may  help  in  building  better  models  of  human  behav- 
ior.  Insight  in  the  way  economics  has  been  dealing  with  the  nature  of 
cost  may help  to  show  that  economics  and  psychology  are  dealing  with 
a  common  set  of  questions.  It  is  for  these  reasons  that  costs  will  be 
focused  upon  here.  Cost  is  so  intertwined  with  the  domain  of  both 
psychology  and  economics,  i.e.,  decision  making  and  behavior,  that  it 
may  serve as a starting  point  for  further  future  collaboration  of  the  two 
disciplines. 
First,  the  relationship  between  cost  and value  will be  explored.  Next, 
the  way cost  is treated  in social  exchange  theory  and  in attitude-behav- 
ior  models  is discussed. 
Cost  and value 
The  theory  of  costs  is  not  one  of  those  parts  of  economic  analysis 
that  has  been  neglected.  It  has  always  occupied  a  more  or  less  central 
position,  and  it has  been  the  subject  of  a formidable  body  of  work. 
Different  conceptions  of  what  a cost  exactly  is,  i.e.,  what  constitutes 
a  cost,  have  appeared  and  disappeared  in  economics.  Many  of  the 
differences  in  conception  depend  essentially,  as  Robbins  (1973)  states, 
on  differences  of  objects  and  assumptions,  To  present  a  definition  of 
cost  that  does  not  violate  any  of  the  assumptions  underlying  the 
different  conceptions  of  the nature  of cost  is difficult.  Buchanan  (1969) 
offers  a general  definition  explaining  that  cost  refers  to  a  loss of value. 
He  (Buchanan  1969:  7)  argues  that  the  elemental  meaning  of  the  word 
‘cost’  is  that  of  pain  or  sacrifice.  Asking  a person  how  much  a certain 
behavior  did actually  cost,  is analogous  to  asking  the  person  how  much 
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Three  general  dimensions  in  cost  conceptions  can  be  distinguished. 
The  dimensions  refer  to: 
(a)  what  kind  of  general  value  is lost, 
(b)  whose  value  is lost, 
(c)  how  the  value  loss  is determined. 
Outlay  cost  and  opportunity  cost 
There  are  two  ideas  of  the  ‘real’  or  ‘true’  nature  of  cost  and  value, 
i.e.,  of  what  kind  of  general  value  is lost. 
The  central  element  in outlay  cost is the so-called  labor-cost  doctrine 
of  value,  that  focuses  on  the  sacrifice  of  giving  up  scarce  resources  in 
order  to  acquire  a commodity.  The  cost  of  a  commodity  is  defined  as 
the  labor  needed  to  acquire  the  commodity  (Smith  [1776]  1983).  The 
required  labor  may  involve  pain,  ‘ . . .  something  that  can  within  limits 
be  measured  by  sweat,  muscle  fatigue  and  tears’  (Buchanan,  1969:  7). 
So,  cost  is  associated  with  the  outlays  for  a  commodity,  and  cost  is 
called  pain  cost,  real  cost,  out-of-pocket  cost  or  outlay  cost  (see,  e.g., 
Buchanan  1969;  Thaler  1980).  The  neutral  term  outlay  cost  will be used 
in  the  sequel. 
The  central  element  in  opportunity  cost  is  the  choice-cost  doctrine 
of  value,  that  focuses  on  the  pain  one  has  to  bear  when  choosing 
between  mutually  exclusive  alternatives.  Smith  ([1776]  1983:  ch.  6) 
already  employed  the  choice-cost  doctrine  when  he  stated:  ‘ . . .  if 
among  a nation  of hunters,  for  example,  it costs  twice  the  labour  to kill 
a  beaver  which  it  does  to  kill  a  deer,  one  beaver  should  naturally 
exchange  for,  or be  worth,  two deer’.  In  this  example,  the  ‘real’  cost  is 
no  longer  defined  in  terms  of  the  amount  of  labor.  Cost  is  defined  in 
units  of  another  commodity  in  the  market  place.  So,  ‘If  the  choice  lies 
between  the  production  or  purchase  of  two  commodities,  the  value  of 
one is measured  by  the  sacrifice  of going without  the  other’  (Davenport 
1894:  567-568).  This  can  simply  be  reformulated  as  ‘.  . .  the  cost  of 
beaver  is deer  and  the  cost  of  deer  is beaver’  (Knight  1928:  359). 
Cost  in  this  conception  is  called  opportunity  cost,  altemative-prod- 
uct  cost  or  alternativity  cost  (e.g.  Stigler  1966).  Opportunity  cost  is not 
an  attribute  of  a  commodity  but  an  attribute  of  the  choice  between 
alternatives.  It  is  defined  as  ‘.  . .  the  value  of  the  best  alternative 
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Private  cost  and  social  cost 
A second  relevant  distinction  in cost  conceptions  concerns  the  bearer 
of  the  costs.  Private  cost  (sometimes  called  commercial  cost)  is the  cost 
borne  by  the  decision  maker,  i.e.,  by  the  unit  that  chooses  between 
alternatives.  Social  cost  is  the  cost  borne  by  society  at  large  (see,  e.  g. 
Klein  1977).  An  analogous  distinction  in  benefits  can  be  made. 
The  difference  between  private  and  social  cost  are  so-called  ‘spil- 
lover’  or  external  effects.  Private  cost  equals  social  cost  if  all  positive 
and  negative  consequences  of  a  choice  between  alternatives  are  borne 
by  the  decision-ma~ng  unit.  This  would  be  the  case  if  (a)  the  choice 
had  consequences  for  the  decision-making  unit  only,  or  (b)  the  deci- 
sion-making  unit  received  a  full  compensation  for  the  positive  or 
favorable  spillover  effects,  and  if  the  decision-making  unit  would  fully 
compensate  society  for  the  negative  or unfavorable  spillover  effects.  In 
option  (a)  all effects  are internal,  while in option  (b)  the  external  effects 
of  a  choice  are  internalized,  i.e.  ‘priced’  for  the  decision-Ming  unit. 
Unfavorable  spillover  effects  arise  when  the  net  social  cost  (social 
cost  minus  social  benefit)  exceeds  the  net  private  cost.  Mishan  (1970) 
argues  that  such  a  situation  arises  in  the  case  of  the  automobile.  He 
conjectures  that  by  far  the greater  part  of its cost  is borne  by  the  public 
at large  and not  by  the owner  (driver).  The  public  at large  is confronted 
with  motor  noise,  exhaust  gases,  accident  risks,  less  space  and  so  on. 
The  owner  (driver)  does  not  fully  compensate  the  public  at  large  for 
these  costs,  so, his/her  private  cost  is lower  than  the  social  cost. 
Favorable  spillover  effects  arise  when  the  net  private  cost  exceeds 
the  net  social  cost.  This  is the  case  when  a certain  decision  has  benefits 
for  the  public  at  large  exceeding  the  costs  for  the  public  at  large,  next 
to  the  benefits  to  the  decision  making  unit.  E.g.,  wood  growing  for  the 
furniture  industry  may  have  a positive  effect  on  the  air  quality.  If  this 
positive,  non-marketed,  effect  exceeds  the  social  costs  (resource  deple- 
tion,  noise  and so on),  the net  private  cost  of wood  growing  exceeds  the 
social  cost. 
Objective  cost  and  subjective  cost 
In  the  objective  cost  conception  (Buchanan  1969:  47),  cost  is extra- 
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server,  or consensus  among  a group  of outside  observers  about  the  cost 
can  be  reached. 
In  the  subjective  cost  conception,  cost  is an  intra-individual  quality. 
It  is associated  with  the  experienced  value  loss  by  the  decision-making 
unit,  and  is viewed  as  the  result  of  a more  or  less  complex  process  in 
which  a  decision  maker  transforms  expected  or  experienced  attributes 
of  a commodity  or choice  situation  into  subjective  evaluations.  Evalua- 
tions  of  a  certain  commodity  or  choice  situation  may  differ  between 
individuals  due  to  differences  in  the  valuation  process,  and  thus  can 
not  be  determined  extra-  or  interindividually.  In  this  view  costs  are 
always  subjective  cost. 
The  difference  between  objective  and  subjective  cost  is  a  matter  of 
conceptualization,  not  of  (unit  of)  measurement.  Objective  cost  is 
measured  in  some  common  agreed  unit,  e.g.,  money,  time  or,  if  ap- 
propriate,  beaver.  Subjective  cost  can  be  converted  into  the  same  units. 
For  instance,  a  person  can  be  asked  to  attach  a  money  price  to  the 
annoyance  that  is  caused  by  the  heavy  trucks  that  pass  his  house  all 
day  long  (a  form  of  ‘shadow  pricing’).  Then,  money  is  used  as  a 
convenient  measuring  rod  to assess  the value  of a subjective  experience. 
However,  the  extent  of  value  loss  is  still  treated  as  subjective,  i.e., 
intra-individual. 
General  conceptions  of  cost 
Combining  the  three  dimensions,  eight  specific  cost  conceptions 
could  be  construed,  e.g.,  objective  private  outlay  cost,  and  subjective 
social  opportunity  cost.  In  practice,  the  social  cost  conception  is  only 
applied  in  formal  cost-benefit  analyses  concerned  with  the  welfare  of 
society  at  large  (Mishan  1982),  usually  as  objective  opportunity  cost. 
When  decisions  of  individuals  or organizations  are  concerned  a private 
cost  conception  is most  relevant.  The  four  general  private  cost  concep- 
tions  are introduced. 
Objective  outlay  cost  is  a  central  element  in  the  classical  and  neoc- 
lassical  schools  of  financial  accounting  (hence  the  term  ‘accountant 
cost’  Thirlby  1946),  where  objective  past  outlays  are  used  as  the 
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ities  are valued  at  their  market  price  at  the  date  of  acquisition  and  are 
shown  in the  financial  statements  at  that  value  or an  amortized  portion 
of  it.  Objective  outlay  cost  is  sometimes  called  historical  cost,  or  sunk 
cost,  to  stress  that  it  refers  to  past  outlays.  Valuation  on  the  basis  of 
historical  cost  may  produce  incorrect  figures  of  the  present  value  of 
commodities  if  value  changes  over  time  are  ignored.  For  example,  the 
present  value  of  Manhattan  Island  is  probably  somewhat  higher  than 
the  $24  that  the  Dutch  paid  for  it  to  the  members  of  a  native  tribe 
some  centuries  ago  (see,  e.g.,  Stigler  (1966:  104)  for  this  example).  At 
the  Erasmus  University  Library,  the  value  of  a book  is  determined  on 
the  basis  of  past  financial  outlays.  The  fine  when  not  returning  a book 
equals  the  price  the  book  was  originally  bought  for. 
Subjective  outlay  cost  refers  to  the  experienced  and/or  expected  loss 
of  value  when  giving  up  scarce  resources  to  acquire  a  commodity.  In 
this  conception,  cost  is  sometimes  called  choice-influenced  cost  or  ‘ex 
post’  cost,  to  distinguish  it  from  opportunity  cost  that  is  viewed  as 
choice-influencing  or  ‘ex  ante’  cost  (Buchanan  1969).  Decisions  have  a 
number  of consequences.  After  a commitment  to  an action,  the  individ- 
ual  (and  sometimes  others  as  well)  bears  the  consequences.  Although 
the  person  may not  regret  the decision,  the  ‘pain’  or ‘sacrifice’  of giving 
up  scarce  resources  may  still  be  experienced.  Subjective  outlay  cost 
may  be  experienced  both  after,  while,  or  before  the  actual  outlays  are 
made.  As  the  coward  may  experience  the  pain  caused  by  the  needle 
even  before  the  nurse  gives the  shot. 
Objective  opportunity  cost  deals  with  the  objective  value  of  the  best 
alternative  forgone.  This  conception  is the  basis  of  modern  price  theory 
in  economics.  Stigler  (1966)  illustrates  the  conception  arguing  that  the 
cost  of an acre  of land  to  agricultural  uses is the  amount  the  land  could 
yield  in  nonagricultural  uses,  and  that  the  cost  of  the  acre  of  land  to 
wheat  growing  farmer  X  is  the  amount  the  land  would  yield  to  other 
wheat  farmers,  as well  as  all  other  non-wheat  uses.  If  the  value  of  the 
best  alternative  changes,  so  does  the  opportunity  cost  of  the  acre  of 
land. 
Subjective  opportunity  cost  refers  to  the  opportunity  cost  as  expe- 
rienced  by  the  decision  maker.  Forgone  value,  it  is  argued  in  this 
conception,  can  not  be  determined  by  anyone  else  than  by  the  decision 
maker.  In  this  conception,  cost  can  be  called  choice-influencing  cost  or 
ex  ante  cost. R.G.M.  Pieters  /  Cost in economic psychology  441 
Is  cost  only financial  in  nature? 
Traditionally  economic  models  of  decision  making  do  not  include 
other  than  monetary  cost  (implying  either  that  the  ‘total  value  loss’  is 
incorporated  in  the  monetary  cost,  or  that  the  former  is  not  the  case 
but  that  the  non-monetary  cost  does  not  exist,  can  not  be  measured,  or 
is  too  small  to  make  a difference). 
In  order  to  behave,  an  individual  has  to  make  use  of  his/her 
monetary  and  behavioral  resources  (Verhallen  and  Pieters  1984).  The 
behavioral  resources  comprise  time  (Becker  1976),  physical  and  mental 
energy  (Marks  1977).  Physical  energy  refers  to  labor  and  strength. 
Mental  energy  refers  to  the  general  and  situation-specific  cognitive 
capacity  of  individuals.  When  behavioral  resources  are  sacrificed,  be- 
havioral  costs  are  made. 
When  attempting  to  build  a  cost-accounting  framework  in  social 
psychology,  all  cost  conceptions  treated  in  the  preceding  section  are 
needed.  Objective  cost  indicates  the price  of  alternatives.  The  monetary 
price  can  be  distinguished  from  the  behavioral  price  (time  demand, 
demand  on  thinking  capacity  and  strength  and  so  on).  Second,  the 
social  cost  conception  has  its  place.  It  is relevant  to  analyze  the  extent 
to  which  people  have  internalized  externalities  (compare  research  on 
altruism,  environmental  concern  and  the  like).  For  a descriptive  theory 
of  decision  making  the  subjective  private  outlay  and  opportunity  cost 
concepts  are  central. 
How  is  cost  treated  in  social  psychological  theories  of  human  func- 
tioning?  In  the  next  sections,  social  exchange  theory  and  attitude 
theory  will be  focused  upon. 
Social exchange  theory  and  cost 
The  concept  of  cost  is  present  in  several  theories  and  models  of 
social  behavior.  Yet,  only  in  social  exchange  theory  does  cost  receive 
more  than  superficial  attention. 
Social  exchange  theory  is  concerned  with  the  general  processes  and 
principles  that  govern  the  provision,  trade  or  transfer  of  more  or  less 
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Social  exchange  theory  is not  a homogeneous  theory,  in fact  it is more  a 
collection  of  theories  that  share  a  number  of  characteristics  (McClin- 
tack  et  al.  1984). 
In  social  exchange  theory  both  outlay  cost  and  opportunity  cost  are 
treated.  Homans  (1961:  58-60)  explicitly  defines  cost  as  opportunity 
cost.  A  central  element  in  the  social  exchange  theory  of  Thibaut  and 
Kelley  (1959)  is the  exchange  of  valued  resources  between  members  of 
dyadic  and  more  complex  relationships.  Interactions  between  persons 
in  dyads  are  treated  as  exchange  relationships.  Interactions  lead  to 
outcomes  that  are  valued  by  the  participants  in  the  interaction.  Two 
general  criteria  are  used  in  this  valuation  process: 
(a)  the  Comparison  Level  (CL),  and 
(b)  the  Comparison  Level  for  Alternatives  (CLalt). 
The  Comparison  Level  (CL)  is  a  standard  to judge  the  value  of  the 
outcomes  in  terms  of  what  the  person  feels  s/he  deserves.  If  the 
outcomes  fall  below  the  CL,  the  interaction  is valued  negatively,  if  they 
fall  above  the  CL,  the  interaction  is  valued  positively.  The  CL  is 
influenced  by  one’s  personal  history,  and  by  expectations  of  attaining 
certain  outcomes.  The  CL  refers  to  the  rewards,  benefits,  of  a  rela- 
tionship  relative  to  the  outlays. 
The  Comparison  Level  for  Alternatives  (CLalt)  is  ‘ . . .  the  standard 
the  member  uses  in  deciding  whether  to  remain  in  or  leave  the 
relationship’  (Thibaut  and  Kelley  1959:  21).  CLalt  is defined  informally 
as  the  lowest  level  of  outcomes  a  member  will  accept  in  the  light  of 
available  alternatives.  In  Thibaut  and  Kelley’s  words  (1959:  22)  ‘ . . . 
The  height  of the  CLalt  will depend  mainly  on the  quality  of  the  best  of 
the  members  available  alternatives’.  The  Comparison  Level  for Alterna- 
tives  is the  opportunity  cost. 
Recently,  Rusbult  (1980)  has  extended  the  work  of  Thibaut  and 
Kelley  by  specifying  an  investment  model  of  romantic  associations. 
The  primary  goal  of  the  investment  model  is  to  predict  the  degree  of 
commitment  to,  and  satisfaction  with  a  variety  of  forms  of  ongoing 
associations  (e.g.,  romantic,  friendship,  business)  with  wide  ranging 
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pressed  simply  as: 
Corn,=  Ox+  I,-  O,,  0) 
I,=  i  wixri,  (2) 
i=l 
ox=  2  wj  X  aj,  (3) 
j=l 
where  Corn,  is  the  commitment  to  action  X,  0,  is  the  outcome  value 
of  action  X,  I,  is the  investment  value  of  action  X,  0,  is the  outcome 
value  of  action  Y,  assuming  Y  is the  best  available  alternative  to  X,  r, 
is  the  size of  the  investment  of  resource  j  in  relationship  X,  a,  is  the 
individual’s  subjective  estimate  of  the  value  of  attribute  i  available  in 
relationship  X,  and  w is the  subjective  importance  of  the resources  and 
attributes. 
The  investment  model  of  ongoing  relationships  specifies  that  the 
commitment  to  remain  in  a certain  relationship  X  is a simple  function 
of  the  subjective  benefits  of  X,  the  subjective  historical  outlay  cost  of 
X,  and  the  subjective  opportunity  cost  of  X.  In  two  studies  Rusbult 
(1980)  tested  and  found  support  for  the  investment  model. 
Rusbult’s  study  is  one  of  the  few  recent  studies  that  treat  the  costs 
and  benefits  of  interpersonal  relationships  as  a  central  topic.  Hays 
(1985)  studying  friendship  development  argues  that  although  notions  of 
costs  and  benefits  are  at  the  core  of  a number  of  models  of  friendship 
development,  ‘ . . .  little  data  exist  on  individuals’  perceptions  of  the 
various  costs  and  benefits  accruing  from  their  relationships  or possible 
changes  in  the  types  of  costs  and  benefits  that  emerge  at  different 
stages  of  relationship  development’  (Hays  1985:  909). 
Social  exchange  theory  is one  of the  few attempts  to infuse  economic 
concepts  and  models  in  social  psychological  theory.  These  attempts  do 
not  seem  to  have  had  a  considerable  impact  on  social  psychological 
theorizing. 
Attitude-behavior  models  and  cost 
Attitude  is  by  far  the  most  frequently  studied  concept  in  social 
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tude-behavior  relationships  are  so  numerous,  that  any  review  of  the 
literature  either  is  deemed  to  be  incomplete  or  takes  more  pages  than 
an  average  dictionary.  In  particular  the  literature  on  attitude-behavior 
relationships  is relevant  for  the  present  purpose,  as  for  economics  cost 
and  choice  are fully  intertwined,  so are attitude  and  behavior,  for  social 
psychology. 
The  utility  of  the  attitude  concept  largely  derives  from  its  assumed 
property  to  direct  behavior.  The  model  that  has  dominated  research  on 
attitude-behavior  relationships  in  recent  years  is  the  well-known  Fish- 
bein  and  Ajzen  (1975)  model  of  Reasoned  Action. 
The  question  is how cost  is treated  in attitude  theory,  in particular  in 
the  Fishbein  and Ajzen  type  of  attitude  model.  The  general  form  of  the 
Fishbein  and  Ajzen  model  can  be  summarized  as: 
B=BI=wl  Aact+w2  SN,  (4 
B  stands  for  ‘behavior’,  BI  is  the  behavioral  intention,  Aact  is  the 
attitude  towards  the  act,  and  SN  is  the  subjective  norm.  The  model 
specifies  that  behavior  that  is under  volitional  control  is determined  by 
two  general  factors,  a personal  factor,  the  attitude,  and  a social  factor, 
the  subjective  norm. 
Attitude  is  a positive  or  negative  affect  with  respect  to  the  act.  The 
attitude  is  determined  by  the  summed  expected  consequences  of  the 
behavior,  called  beliefs  (b),  weighted  by  the  evaluation  (e)  of  these 
consequences.  The  subjective  norm  is  the  generalized  pressure  from 
relevant  others.  It  is determined  by  the  social  norms  of  salient  referents 
(nb),  weighted  by  the  motivation  to  comply  (mc)  with  these  social 
norms.  The  relevant  equations  are  well  known  and  are  presented  by, 
e.g.,  Fishbein  and  Azen  (1975). 
Recent  research  with  the  model  has  focused  on  whether  (a)  the 
specified  direct  and  indirect  relationships  in  the  model  are  empirically 
retrieved,  (b)  other  variables  than  the  ones  included  in  the  model 
influence  behavior,  and  whether  (c)  factors  may  moderate  relationships 
between  constructs  in  the  model  (see  Pieters  1988). 
In  the  literature  on  attitude-behavior  relationships  hardly  any  men- 
tion  is  made  of  the  cost  of  behavior.  The  conclusion  of  Meyer  (1982) 
that  attitude  does  not  seem  to  capture  the  non-zero  opportunity  cost  of 
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Subjective  outlays,  revenues  and  attitudes 
Verhallen  and  Pieters  (1984)  argue  that  the  subjective  outlays  and 
revenues  of  a behavior  are  to  be  found  in  the  beliefs-times-evaluation 
expression.  A  typical  belief  statement  in  research  on,  e.g.,  residential 
energy  saving  might  be: 
‘In order  to  save  electricity  in  the  home  I have  to  spend  time’. 
This  belief-statement  represents  the  time-demand  of  ‘saving  electri- 
city  in the home’,  it refers  to the  outlays  in time  one has  to make.  Other 
belief-statements  represent  revenues,  e.g.,  the  psychic  revenue  of  ‘being 
a  good  citizen  when  saving  energy’,  or  the  monetary  revenue,  when 
paying  a lower  electricity  bill. 
In  the  Reasoned  Action  Model,  the  belief  is  multiplied  by  an 
evaluation  of  the  expected  outcome.  An  evaluation  of  a belief  indicates 
whether  an expected  consequence  of behavior  is liked  or disliked  by  the 
person,  i.e., whether  a donsequence  is perceived  as an outlay  or whether 
it  is  perceived  as  a  revenue.  Negatively  evaluated  consequences  con- 
stitute  costs,  positively  evaluated  consequences  constitute  benefits.  In 
other  words,  a  combination  of  a  belief  and  an  evaluation  forms  a 
subjective  cost  or benefit  element. 
Cost  and  benefit  elements  are  not  distinguished  in  the  Reasoned 
Action  model.  As  a  consequence,  most  research  with  the  model  does 
not  provide  much  insight  into  the  structure  of  the  subjective  costs  and 
benefits  and  how  this  relates  to  behavior.  How  do  people  weigh  the 
costs  and  benefits  in  decisions  about  some  specific  behavior.  Are 
certain  people  more  cost-sensitive  and  others  more  benefit-sensitive? 
(compare  Kahneman  and  Tversky  (1979)  on  risk-pronenesse  and  risk- 
aversiveness).  Are  costs  weighed  more  heavily  than  benefits,  when  and 
by who?  How  do the  experienced  costs  and benefits  of behavior  change 
in  the  course  of  time? 
Analogous  to  the  investment  model  of  Rusbult  (1980),  the  costs  and 
benefits  of behavior  (subjective  outlays  and  revenues)  can  be  treated  as 
separate  constructs  (see  Pieters  and  Verhallen  1986;  Pieters  1987). 
Subjective  opportunity  cost  and  attitudes 
The  opportunity  cost  of  a  certain  action  is  not  represented  in  the 
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attitude  toward  one  specific  act  {or  object)  is determined.  To  represent 
the  opportunity  cost  of  performing  this  act,  the  attitude  towards 
performing  the  best  alternative  should  be  taken  into  account.  If  behav- 
ior involves  a choice  between  alternatives,  one  should  determine  (a)  the 
alternatives  in  the  subjective  choice  set  of  individuals,  (b)  the  alterna- 
tive  valued  highest  next  to  the  target  action. 
Behavior  is crucially  determined  by the  set of possibilities  open  to  an 
individual.  Individuals  act  on  the  basis  of  their  personal  knowledge 
about  the  choice  set,  which  may  often  differ  systematically  from  the 
actual  choice  set  (Frey  and  Foppa  1986).  Frey  (1983)  argues  that  in, 
e.g.,  political  decision  making  the  opportunity  cost  of  behavior  often 
receives  a  low  weight.  Thaler  (1980)  found  in  his  research  that  com- 
pared  to  outlay  cost,  opportunity  cost  is often  underweighted  (referred 
to  as the  endowment  effect). 
More  research  is  needed  concerning  the  factors  influencing  the  size 
and  content  of the  individual’s  choice  set,  and  the  role  opportunity  cost 
plays  in deter~ning  behavior.  The  opportu~ty  cost  of behavior  can  be 
incorporated  in  attitude  models  analogously  as it has  been  done  in  the 
investment  model. 
Conclusion 
Cost  and  value  bridge  economic  and  psychological  theories  of  hu- 
man  functioning.  The  concepts  may provide  the common  ground  for  an 
intensive  joint  research  programme  in the  disciplines  of psychology  and 
economics. 
Many  economic  issues  need  joint  study.  Entrepreneurs  decision 
making  is  just  one  of  such  issues.  The  list  of  interesting  research 
questions  that  Hayes  (1950)  provided  40 years  ago includes  decisions  to 
establish  an  enterprise,  to  buy  into  a  going  enterprise,  to  increase 
investment  in an  enterprise,  to  sell a portion  of  the  enterprise,  to  invest 
in  certain  projects  and  not  in  others,  to  take  a  loan,  to  hire  certain 
professionals  and  so  on.  Consumer  decision  making  has  been  studied 
extensively  in  the  last  decades,  mainly  from  a  purely  psychological 
point  of view. More  intense  cooperation  between  social  psychology  and 
economics  in  this  domain  may  prove  quite  rewarding. 
There  are  also  several  traditionally  non-economic  issues  where  col- 
laboration  between  economics  and  psychology  might  be  fruitful.  Re- R.G.M.  Pieters  /  Cost in economic psychology  453 
search  on  altruism  and  moral  behavior  might  be  such  an  issue.  Both 
psychologists  and  economist  have  been  working  in  this  domain,  with  a 
more  common  focus  than  they  might  expect  at  first  sight  (see  Becker 
(1976)  on  interdependent  utility  functions  and  Dovidio  (1984)  on 
personal  norms  of  aiding  and  fairness,  and  on  cost  and  reward  consid- 
erations  in  helping).  Among  the  other  issues  intimate  relationships, 
marriage  and  romantic  associations  might  also  be  fruitfully  studied  in 
cooperation  (Frey  and  Foppa  1986). 
At  the  level  of  model  and  theory  building,  more  cooperation  is 
possible  as  well.  In  economics,  value  and  cost  have  been  central 
constructs.  The  utility  of  commodities  and  alternatives,  and  the  way 
(subjective  expected)  utility  relates  to  choice  have  been  studied  in 
depth.  In  social  psychology,  attitude,  and  attitude-behavior  models 
have  dominated  research.  Analysis  of  the  relationships  between  values, 
cost  and  choice  should  attract  more  joint  research.  Combining  the 
theories  and  methods  developed  in  economics  and  social  psychology  is 
needed  here  (see  also  Antonides  1989). 
In  Behavior  Cost  Accounting  the  expected  and  experienced  conse- 
quences  of  a behavior  are  analyzed  from  a cost  perspective.  Analyzing 
behavior  from  such  a  perspective  does  not  imply  that  individuals  are 
highly  involved  and  rationally  adding  and  subtracting  costs  and  be- 
nefits  when  deciding  about  alternative  courses  of  action.  The  contrary 
may  be  the  rule.  The  present  approach  is  descriptive  in  nature.  Costs 
are  distinguished  from  benefits,  outlay  costs  from  opportunity  costs. 
Consequences  that  directly  affect  the  individual  (private)  can  be  dis- 
tinguished  from  all  other  consequences.  It  can  be  determined  to  what 
extent  individuals  have  internalized  consequences  of  their  behavior  for 
others  (other  people,  the  environment  and  so  on),  i.e.,  to  what  extent 
they  have  internalized  externalities.  It  can  be  analyzed  when  individu- 
als rely on opportunity  cost  in choosing  between  alternatives,  and when 
they  rely on  outlay  cost,  and  when  on both. 
In  the past,  interest  from  economics  in psychology  mainly  focused  at 
the  descriptive  models  and  theories  of  motivation  and  choice  that 
psychology  could  offer.  Psychology  has  been  most  interested  in  the 
domain,  the  topics,  of  economics.  The  study  of  economic  behavior  has 
long  been  treated  as  merely  a  new  domain  to  apply  the  general 
psychological  theories  to.  Although  this  has  been  a  profitable  oper- 
ation,  even  more  might  be  gained  for  Economic  Psychology  when 
attention  is  paid  to  the  concepts,  models  and  theories  developed  in 454  R. G.  M.  Pieters  /  Cost in economc  psychology 
economics.  Cost  is  a valuable  concept  when  trying  to  understand  and 
predict  human  behavior. 
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